International Scientific Journal of Contemporary Research in Social Sciences and Humanities
2026 / No. 1 (1)
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL | OPEN ACCESS
Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR NATIONAL ECONOMIC SECURITY: LINKING RISK ASSESSMENT, POLICY COORDINATION, AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE

Kopalova Salima
Tashkent State University of Economics
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
Kopalovas06@gmail.com

Abstract. Economic security has moved from the margins of foreign-policy debate to the centre of national strategy. Supply shocks, export controls, tariffs and the deliberate use of economic dependencies as instruments of pressure make it hard for governments to treat prosperity and security as separate files. This article argues that national economic security is best planned as a single cycle in which risk assessment, policy coordination and economic resilience feed one another, instead of three activities run in parallel by different ministries. Using a qualitative reading of official documents from the OECD, the IMF, the World Economic Forum, the European Commission, the G7 and the Government of Japan, together with Uzbekistan's national strategy and local reporting, the article proposes a five-stage planning framework and tests its logic against the Uzbek case. It concludes with recommendations for governments that want security without giving up openness.

Keywords: economic security; strategic planning; risk assessment; policy coordination; economic resilience; supply chains; Uzbekistan

Introduction. For most of the past three decades, ministries of economy and ministries of defence worked in largely separate worlds. Trade policy aimed at efficiency, security policy at deterrence, and the two met mainly at the border, where export-control lists did their quiet work. That separation no longer holds. The pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the spread of sanctions and export restrictions, and the open use of tariffs as bargaining tools have shown that a break in the supply of a semiconductor, a

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

fertiliser or a payment channel can threaten a country's stability almost as surely as a military threat once did (OECD, 2025).

Perceptions of risk have shifted accordingly. In its 2026 edition, the World Economic Forum ranked geoeconomic confrontation first among near-term global risks: 18 per cent of respondents saw it as the risk most likely to trigger a global crisis in 2026, and it climbed eight places in the two-year severity ranking (WEF, 2026). The survey behind the report covers more than 1,300 leaders and experts, so it measures perception rather than outcomes, yet the direction of travel is hard to ignore.

Governments have answered with strategies, laws and coordination forums, but it is less clear how these pieces fit together. A risk register that nobody acts on is of little use. A coordination forum without shared risk analysis tends to produce statements rather than decisions. A subsidy or stockpiling programme that is not tied to a clear view of vulnerability can spend a great deal while leaving the real gaps open. This article therefore asks how strategic planning can link risk assessment, policy coordination and economic resilience into one coherent approach to national economic security.

The method is qualitative document analysis. The study draws on primary and near-primary sources: reports and communications from international organisations and governments, supplemented by reputable news and think-tank commentary where official texts were not available in English. Policy documents describe intentions more reliably than results, and that limit is kept in view throughout. The sections that follow set out the concepts, describe the risk landscape, examine risk assessment, coordination and resilience in turn, propose an integrated framework, apply it to Uzbekistan, and close with recommendations.

Conceptual Foundations

Economic security has no single agreed definition, and the differences between definitions are instructive. The European Union frames the problem as minimising risks that arise from certain economic flows at a time of geopolitical tension and fast technological change, while keeping the economy as open and dynamic as possible (European Commission & High Representative, 2023). Japan's approach is written into

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

the very title of its 2022 law, which speaks of ensuring security through the integrated use of economic measures (METI, 2023). Both start from the same worry, that some economic ties carry security costs, and both insist that the cure should not be worse than the disease.

For the purposes of this article, national economic security means a state's capacity to keep its essential economic functions running, and to protect its freedom of policy choice, when it faces deliberate pressure or large external shocks. Three related terms need to be kept apart. A risk is the combination of a threat and its likely impact. A vulnerability is the feature of the economy that lets a threat do damage, such as dependence on one supplier or one transport corridor. Resilience is the ability to absorb a shock, adapt to it and recover. The OECD makes a point that planners often forget: the aim is not to eliminate risk but to navigate it well (OECD, 2025). A country that tried to remove every dependency would end up poorer and, as later sections show, no safer.

The Contemporary Risk Landscape

Risks to economic security come from several directions at once. The first is concentration: when a few suppliers, firms or routes dominate the supply of a critical input, a single failure spreads quickly. The OECD finds that strategic manufacturing sectors with complex supply chains, such as petroleum and electronics, are among the most exposed (OECD, 2025). The second is weaponisation, where one state uses another's dependence as leverage through export bans, boycotts or sanctions. The European Commission lists the weaponisation of economic dependencies and economic coercion as one of four risk areas that need systematic assessment (European Commission & High Representative, 2023).

The third risk is the fragmentation of the system itself. The IMF's staff review of the evidence suggests that severe trade fragmentation could cut global output by up to 7 per cent, and that losses could reach 8 to 12 per cent in some countries if technological decoupling is added; even limited fragmentation could cost around 0.2 per cent (IMF, 2023). The same note warns that emerging and low-income economies are likely to be hit hardest, partly because financial regionalisation would reduce international risk-

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

sharing and leave national buffers under more strain. The WEF adds mounting debt, possible asset bubbles and inflation pressure to the picture (WEF, 2026). The lesson for planners is that economic security risks are rarely isolated. They combine trade, technology, finance and infrastructure, and they travel across sectors faster than most government departments do.

Risk Assessment: Seeing the Problem Clearly

Risk assessment is where national planning either becomes credible or drifts into slogans. The European approach is a useful reference because it is explicit about method. It proposes a common methodology and a structured assessment in four areas: the resilience of supply chains, the physical and cyber security of critical infrastructure, technology security and leakage, and the weaponisation of dependencies (European Commission & High Representative, 2023). Two principles, proportionality and precision, are meant to keep measures narrow and tied to specific risks. Japan reaches a similar place by a different road. Its law designates specified critical materials on the basis of criteria that include how essential the good is and how far supply depends on outside sources (METI, 2023).

Good assessment has a recognisable shape. It begins by mapping which functions the economy cannot do without. It then traces the dependencies behind those functions, down to the second and third tier of suppliers where hidden concentration often sits. Each dependency is scored for likelihood of disruption and severity of impact, and the results are tested against scenarios, including extreme ones. The OECD's country annexes, which track interdependence with trading partners and the readiness of the policy environment, show that such monitoring is now feasible with existing data (OECD, 2025). The main discipline is selectivity. If everything is labelled critical, nothing is, and the budget is spread too thin to protect anything properly. The private sector must also be inside the process, because firms hold much of the data on suppliers and the European strategy explicitly calls business an essential partner (European Commission & High Representative, 2023).

International Scientific Journal of Contemporary Research in Social Sciences and Humanities
2026 / No. 1 (1)
ELECTRONIC JOURNAL | OPEN ACCESS
Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

Policy Coordination: Aligning Actors and Instruments

Even a perfect risk map achieves little if the instruments sit in different hands. Coordination has to work at three levels. Inside government, someone must be able to bring trade, industry, finance, energy, digital and security agencies to one table. Japan's solution places overall coordination in the Cabinet Office, under a minister and a director-general responsible for economic security, and its law rests on four pillars: stable supply of critical materials, support for key technologies, screening of essential infrastructure and confidential handling of sensitive patents (METI, 2023; Timewell, 2026). The first designation list, issued in December 2022, covered eleven product categories, among them semiconductors, storage batteries and machine tools, and commentary based on Cabinet Office documents indicates that the list had grown to sixteen items by July 2026 (Timewell, 2026).

Between government and business, coordination means predictable rules, clear reporting duties and real incentives. Between states, it means sharing information and, where possible, acting together. At Hiroshima in 2023 the G7 launched a Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion built around early warning, rapid information sharing, regular consultation, joint assessment and coordinated responses, and it tied the effort to a rules-based system with the WTO at its core (G7, 2023). Analysts noted that the summit concentrated on supply chain resilience, countering coercion and protecting critical technologies (CSIS, 2023). The G7 text also calls for a larger role for developing countries in building resilience, a reminder that coordination should not be a club for the wealthy alone.

Economic Resilience: Building the Capacity to Absorb and Adapt

Resilience is where assessment and coordination turn into something the economy can feel. The OECD's central finding is that agile, adaptable and aligned supply chains are the real source of strength, and that governments can support them through trade facilitation, lower barriers in services such as transport and finance, and secure digitalisation (OECD, 2025). It is equally clear that simply bringing all production home would weaken, not strengthen, resilience. Trade-press coverage of the review reports its

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

modelling as showing that a push towards domestic supply chains could reduce global trade by more than 18 per cent and global GDP by more than 5 per cent without improving resilience to disruption (MH&L News, 2025). Those figures come from a scenario exercise and should be read as an order of magnitude, but the message is consistent with the IMF's view that deeper fragmentation brings deeper costs (IMF, 2023).

In practice, resilience is built from many modest layers. Diversifying suppliers and routes reduces concentration. Targeted stockpiles and reserve capacity cover goods whose absence would be dangerous and whose substitutes are slow to develop. Strong fiscal and financial buffers give a government time to respond. Skilled workers and flexible firms can shift to new inputs.

An Integrated Planning Framework

Bringing the three elements together, this article proposes a five-stage planning cycle. This framework is the author's own synthesis of the sources reviewed rather than an official model. The first stage, sensing and assessing, builds a shared picture of dependencies and threats using data from government, firms and international partners. The second, prioritising and deciding, narrows the list to the few vulnerabilities that justify action and sets proportionate responses. The third, coordinating and acting, assigns each response to an agency, aligns it with business and partner states, and funds it. The fourth, building buffers and capacity, invests in diversification, reserves, skills and digital infrastructure so the economy can absorb shocks. The fifth, reviewing and learning, measures results, tests scenarios and feeds the findings back into the first stage.

The cycle echoes the EU's three-part logic of promoting competitiveness, protecting against risks and partnering with others (European Commission & High Representative, 2023), but it adds two features that planners often neglect. One is feedback: assessment is repeated, not done once. The other is explicit attention to the trade-off between security and openness, which should be argued openly at the prioritising stage and not discovered afterwards. Success indicators should be few and measurable, for example the share of critical inputs sourced from a single country, the

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

number of days of reserve cover for essential goods, and the time needed to restore operations after a simulated disruption.

Application to Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan offers a useful test because it combines rapid growth with structural exposure. The strategy Uzbekistan-2030, adopted by presidential decree in September 2023, names sustainable growth, export capacity, green energy, water conservation and the principle of a safe and peace-loving state among its priorities, and it lists the sovereignty and security of the country among its main ideas (Government of Uzbekistan, 2023). Results so far are substantial. The President reported that GDP exceeded 145 billion US dollars in 2025, exports rose 23 per cent to 33.4 billion dollars, and gold and foreign-exchange reserves passed 60 billion dollars for the first time (Kun.uz, 2025). Later reporting says the 2030 target has been raised to 300 billion dollars (Times of Central Asia, 2026).

Read through the five-stage framework, the picture is encouraging but incomplete. In the documents reviewed here, economic security appears as a thread running through several priorities and not as a stand-alone doctrine like those of Japan or the EU. That is not a weakness in itself, yet it means that sensing and prioritising may be handled sector by sector. The country's geography reinforces the need for a joined-up view: Uzbekistan is doubly landlocked and therefore depends on neighbours for access to world markets. Regional commentary also identifies water as a constraint on future growth and notes that sustaining growth will rely increasingly on productivity and efficient private investment (Times of Central Asia, 2026). On the positive side, the strategy's 100 objectives are assessed annually (Dunyo IA), which provides the review mechanism the fifth stage requires, and large reserves give the country room to build buffers. A practical next step would be a periodic national dependency assessment, covering energy, food, water, transport corridors, digital infrastructure and key imports, with results shared across ministries and with business.

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

Challenges and Limitations

Several difficulties deserve honest mention. First, data are imperfect, and deep supplier tiers are often invisible even to the firms involved. Second, unilateral action by one country can trigger retaliation, so coordination with partners is part of the risk calculation, not an optional extra. Third, targets shift. Uzbekistan's GDP goal for 2030 has been revised more than once as growth outpaced expectations (Kun.uz, 2025; Times of Central Asia, 2026), which is good news but illustrates how planning baselines move. Finally, this study relies on documents and secondary reporting, and several figures come from official statements or trade press that were not independently verified. Future research should test the framework with quantitative indicators and comparative case studies.

Policy Recommendations

Four recommendations follow. First, establish a standing coordination body with the authority to commission cross-sector risk assessments and to bring agencies, business associations and, where appropriate, regional partners together. Second, adopt a published, proportionate assessment method with clear criteria for designating critical goods and services, so that firms and partners understand why measures are taken. Third, invest in resilience that also supports growth, such as trade facilitation, digital logistics, diversified energy and transport links, and skills, rather than relying on blanket localisation. Fourth, institutionalise review through annual reporting, scenario exercises and sunset clauses for emergency measures. For smaller and middle-income economies, joining regional and international cooperation arrangements is often the most efficient way to gain early warning and bargaining weight that no single state could generate alone.

Conclusion. National economic security is a planning problem as much as a policy problem. Risk assessment without coordination leaves findings on the shelf, coordination without assessment spends political energy on the wrong targets, and resilience without either becomes an expensive habit. Linking the three in a repeating cycle gives governments a way to protect what matters while keeping the economy open

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

to the trade and investment that make it prosperous. The evidence from the OECD, the IMF and the WEF points the same way: the costs of fragmentation are large, the risks are interconnected, and the best defence is a capable, adaptable and well-coordinated economy. For countries such as Uzbekistan, which are growing fast and integrating with the world, the window to build these capacities is now, while reserves are strong and reforms are still gathering pace.

References:

1. CSIS. (2023). G7 Hiroshima summit outcomes. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/g7-hiroshima-summit-outcomes
2. Dunyo IA. (n.d.). Leading business publication of India covers the updated "Uzbekistan-2030" strategy. https://dunyo.info/en/strategy2030/vedushchee-delovoe-izdanie-indii-rasskazalo-ob-obnovlennoy-strategii
3. European Commission & High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2023). Joint communication on "European Economic Security Strategy" (JOIN(2023) 20 final). https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10919-2023-INIT/en/pdf
4. G7. (2023). G7 leaders' statement on economic resilience and economic security. Hiroshima, 20 May 2023. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/hiroshima23/documents/pdf/session5_01_en.pdf
5. Government of Uzbekistan. (2023). Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan No. PD-158 of 11 September 2023 on the Strategy "Uzbekistan-2030". https://gov.uz/en/uzspace/sections/view/78288
6. International Monetary Fund. (2023). Geoeconomic fragmentation and the future of multilateralism (Staff Discussion Note SDN/2023/001). https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/sdn/2023/english/sdnea2023001.pdf

Received: 10 October 2026, Accepted: 20 October 2026, Published: 22 October 2026

7. Kun.uz. (2025, December 26). Uzbekistan's GDP tops $145bn in 2025, targets $240bn by 2030. https://kun.uz/en/news/2025/12/26/uzbekistans-gdp-tops-145bn-in-2025-targets-240bn-by-2030
8. METI. (2023). Japan's economic security strategies and challenges for businesses. In White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2023. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan. https://www.meti.go.jp/english/report/data/wp2023/pdf/2-1-2.pdf
9. MH&L News. (2025). Relocalizing supply chains could hurt growth. https://www.mhlnews.com/global-supply-chain/news/55294366/relocalizing-supply-chains-could-hurt-growth
10. OECD. (2025). OECD supply chain resilience review. OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-supply-chain-resilience-review_94e3a8ea-en/full-report
11. Timewell. (2026). Japan's Economic Security Promotion Act amendment (2026) and specified critical materials guide. https://timewell.jp/en/columns/economic-security-law-amendment-2026
12. Times of Central Asia. (2026). Mirziyoyev sets goal of doubling Uzbekistan GDP by 2030. https://timesca.com/uzbekistan-gdp-target-300-billion-2030/
13. World Economic Forum. (2026, January 14). Global risks report 2026: Geopolitical and economic risks rise in new age of competition. https://www.weforum.org/media/global-risks-report-2026-geopolitical-and-economic-risks-rise-in-new-age-of-competition/